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1

INTRODUCTION

Ralph Waldo Emerson’s status as a canonical figure in American history and literature is
firmly established, but there is little agreement on his place within the philosophical canon. The
most prominent interpretations classify him as either a “pragmatist” or an “Emersonian moral
perfectionist.”1 Yet, there is no consensus on whether these labels are accurate. I will argue for
an alternative approach.2 Emerson should be read as a virtue ethicist.
In the rest of this thesis, I summarize the arguments of scholars who have already
considered if Emerson is a virtue ethicist. I argue these scholars are not nearly as persuasive as
they could be because they do not employ adequate criteria for who counts as a virtue ethicist.
Thus, I summarize Julia Annas’ criteria for membership in the category of a “virtue ethicist” and
show that Emerson fits Annas’ criteria. After showing it is accurate to label Emerson a virtue
ethicist I conclude by offering five reasons why seeing Emerson as a virtue ethicist matters.
2

BUELL, CAFARO, LYSAKER AND URBAS ON EMERSON AS A VIRTUE
ETHICIST
To my knowledge, only four scholars have explicitly considered whether Emerson is a

virtue ethicist.3 Lawrence Buell (2003) and Philip Cafaro (2004) independently argue that

1

Pragmatist and Emersonian moral perfectionist readings of Emerson are now common. Urbas
(2013) dates the start of this “era” of Emerson’s “philosophical rehabilitation” to Stanley
Cavell’s 1978 essay “Thinking of Emerson” in Cavell (2003). For Emersonian moral
perfectionist readings of Emerson, see Cavell (1990, 2003, 2004), Saito (2001, 2005),
Kovalainen (2010), Frank (2011), Laugier (2010), Mulhall (2020). For pragmatist readings, see
Poirier (1987, 1992), West (1989), Goodman (1990) Robinson (1993), Lopez (1996), Stuhr
(1997), Saito (2001, 2005), Anderson (2006), Albrecht (2012).
2
If John Stuhr (1997) is right and “pragmatism” is necessarily defined by the Socratic question,
pragmatist readings of Emerson are compatible with virtue ethicist readings of Emerson. See
Stuhr (1997), ix-x. However, as I shall show later, it is not possible to consistently believe that a
virtue ethicist can also be an Emersonian moral perfectionist.
3
I thank Sandra Dwyer and Eric Wilson for useful suggestions on structuring this section.

2
Emerson is a virtue ethicist for the same reason. They think Emerson’s ethics focus more on
character development rather than on isolated actions.4 While I agree with them, this is not
sufficient to show we should call Emerson a virtue ethicist.
In contrast, John Lysaker (2008) is wary of considering Emerson a virtue ethicist even
though he thinks there are similarities. Specifically, Lysaker thinks Emerson resembles Aristotle
in his concept of character and account of friendships inspired by virtue.”5Yet Lysaker refuses to
conclude Emerson should be classified as a virtue ethicist because “Emerson’s thought shows
signs of too many schools of ethical thought to fit neatly into any one [like virtue ethics].”6 In
other words, Lysaker is skeptical about classifying Emerson as a virtue ethicist because he thinks
Emerson’s ethics is too heterogeneous for any label—including virtue ethics—to be neatly
accurate.7 But, Lysaker’s negative conclusion is questionable, because it only asserts without
providing any evidence that a significant enough amount of Emerson’s ethics is incompatible
with the category of virtue ethics. As I will show, this is not the case.
Finally, Joseph Urbas (2021) thinks that Emerson is a virtue ethicist because he thinks
Emerson’s virtue of prudence entails a belief in the unity of the virtues.8 While I agree with

4

Buell (2003), 212. Cafaro (2004), 6-9.
Lysaker (2008), 127-128, 146.Lysaker is not alone in drawing attention to Emerson’s
philosophy of friendship as a point of comparison between him and other virtue ethicists. For a
Confucian reading of Emerson’s account of friendship, see Foust (2017), 19-40. For a Platonic
and Neoplatonic reading, see Hodder (2010). For a Platonic and Aristotelean reading see
Crosswhite (2010). For a reading which compares Emerson and Aristotle and Cicero, see Lynch
(2005), 45-46, 49-50. For a Stoic and Platonic reading see, Berry (1961) 187-200.
6
Lysaker (2008), 208.
7
In a more recent work, After Emerson (2017), John Lysaker argues that Emerson was sometimes
reluctant to be called a philosopher, and in some respects, should not be considered one. For
example, Emerson openly refuses to state premises and conclusions in the way that is sometimes
considered characteristic of philosophy. For Lysakers’ careful and commendable reconstruction
of Emerson’s relationship to philosophy, see Lysaker (2017) 132-166.
8
Urbas (2021) 110-115.
5
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Urbas that Emerson believes in the unity of the virtues, and that this suggests he likely is a virtue
ethicist, this alone is not a sufficient reason to call him a virtue ethicist; some virtue ethicists
believe in the unity of the virtues, some do not.
Ultimately, none of these scholars’ arguments can adequately determine whether
Emerson is or isn’t a virtue ethicist because they do not offer enough of the relevant criteria. That
said, I think it uncharitable to assert their arguments are inadequate without mentioning what
would be obvious to anyone who reads their works. In the context of their monographs, Buell,
Cafaro, Lysaker and Urbas only wrote a few sentences on the subject of Emerson as a virtue
ethicist. While Emerson’s status as a virtue ethicist is my focus, it is not the primary
argumentative concern of any of these scholars. These scholars had bigger fish to fry.9
But, since I aim to show that Emerson meets the relevant criteria for a virtue ethicist, I
will summarize Julia Annas’ relatively uncontroversial criteria which distinguish between
ancient Greek philosophies of virtue ethics and modern moral theories (deontological or
utilitarian).10 Then, armed with these criteria, I will show that Emerson can meet all of them.

Buell (2003) aims to provide a general introduction to Emerson’s life and work, while Cafaro’s
(2004) primary thesis is that Henry David Thoreau is a virtue ethicist. Whereas Lysaker (2008)
aims to present an account of Emerson’s theory of self-culture and Urbas (2021) seeks to give an
account of Emerson’s entire philosophy as a whole.
10
Why have I not supported my argument with work from other seminal scholars of virtue ethics
such as Slote (1992), Hursthouse (1999), Macintyre (2007) and so on? I have chosen to employ
Annas (1993) alone for two reasons. (1) Using other scholars' works in addition to Annas would
needlessly over complicate my argument for my readers who know little about virtue ethics. (2)
Relative to these other works, Annas is more focused on distinguishing between the shared
assumptions and specific points of disagreement between virtue ethicists.
9
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JULIA ANNAS ON THE NATURE OF ANCIENT GREEK VIRTUE ETHICS
Julia Annas’ Morality of Happiness (1993) lays out assumptions, methods, and aims she

argues unite ancient theories of virtue ethics.11 I will focus on three major criteria.12
Annas’ first criterion is that virtue ethicists are more ethically concerned with developing
our character across our entire life rather than on isolated actions, outcomes, rules or duties.
There are three major ethical categories in contemporary professional philosophy: virtue ethics,
deontology, and consequentialism. Annas’ Morality of Happiness (1993) was instrumental in
distinguishing ancient Greek virtue ethics from “modern ethical theories” by which she means
deontological and consequentialist theories. In contrast to the virtue ethicist:
[The deontologist] embodies the idea that the basic questions in ethics are those concerning what one ought
to do and what one’s duties are; the latter [the consequentialist] embodies the idea that the fundamental
ethical questions are rather those as to how one should produce the best consequences. 13

In short, Annas thinks that deontologists and consequentialists are typically not as interested in
evaluating our character and virtues across our entire life as they are in ethically evaluating
duties, rules or consequences in isolated moments. This is not to say that virtue ethicists do not
care about duties, rules and outcomes: “Rule following, the notion of duty, appeal to what is

While Annas (1993) often writes about “ancient ethics” in the universalizing abstract, she is
always referring only to Ancient Greek virtue ethics. Annas is not, for example, referring to
Classical Chinese ethics which is often recognized as another form of ancient virtue ethics —
though it can be controversial among scholars of Classical Chinese ethics to use the label “virtue
ethics.” Therefore, I only occasionally follow Annas in referring to “ancient ethics” simpliciter,
because I think doing so accidentally reinforces the mistaken idea that the only “ancient
philosophy” worthy of the moniker is Greek. For introductory works on Chinese ethics as a
virtue ethics see Van Norden (2007, 2011), Ivanhoe (2017). For criticism of using the term
“virtue ethics” for Chinese ethics see Ames (2011), Neville (2016). For arguments against the
idea that the only ancient philosophy worthy of the moniker is Greek see Van Norden (2017).
12
I thank Tim O’Keefe for his invaluable help with this entire section.
13
Annas (1993), 6.
11
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beneficial or useful— do have a place within the ancient theories” but this place is subordinate to
the overriding importance of virtue and our character across our entire life.14
Annas’ second criterion is that virtue ethicists typically posit a “final end” for our lives.15
The assumed “entry point for ethical reflection” in virtue ethics is the Socratic question “‘How
ought I to live” or, ‘What should my life be like?’”16 The pupil is invited to consider their entire
life. Are they satisfied with their “life as a whole, with the way it has developed and promises to
continue?” Once we reflect on our life as a whole, Annas argues we naturally conclude that some
of the goods we seek in life are means to ends, and some are ends in themselves.17 All goods are
“nested in a hierarchy of goods.”18 For example, I leave my home to go to the gym, I go to the
gym for health, I pursue health to live well, and so on. In order to give direction to our lives as a
whole, we posit a “final end” or telos towards which we do, and should, direct all the actions that
make up our lives.19 Otherwise, we have no consistent criterion by which to decide between two
goods or actions when both seem equally desirable.20
Eudaimonia, often translated as ‘happiness,’ is nominally agreed upon by Ancient Greek
virtue ethicists as the “indeterminate” and conceptually “thin” specification of the final good
towards which our lives as a whole should aim.21 We can only be guided by “a thin and weak
specification of” the final end because “until we have reflected in depth about the virtues [and

14

Annas (1993), 6. Although Annas does not note it, deontological and utilitarian ethical theories
can be concerned with virtue and character.
15
One interesting exception to this rule are the Cyrenaics. See, Annas (1993), 38.
16
Annas (1993), 27-28
17
Annas (1993), 28-29.
18
Annas (1993), 31.
19
Annas (1993), 31.
20
Annas (1993), 32.
21
Annas (1993), 46.
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become virtuous] we are in no position to make our final end determinate.”22 When Annas refers
to a “thin” final end she is referring to the distinction in contemporary philosophy between
ethically “thick” and “thin” concepts. This distinction will be critical much later in this essay, so
I will briefly clarify it now. Put simply, concepts with less descriptive content are “thin.” More
descriptive content makes a concept “thick.”23 Annas’ point is that in virtue ethics, the final end
is a “thin” concept. In contrast, virtue is a “thick” concept for virtue ethicists.
Annas’ third criterion is that virtue ethicists, notwithstanding some disagreements, all
share a “thick” conception of virtue with three distinct features.24
First, virtue is a disposition acquired through habituation.25 Virtues are the result of our
habitual choices, though virtues are not reducible to “reflexes” or “mindless habits.”26 We can
acquire virtues by habitually choosing to perform virtuous actions in the right situations. In other
words, we can sculpt our character over time. We can try to perform just actions, even if we
struggle initially, in order to slowly make our character more just.27
Second, virtue has an intellectual aspect. Notwithstanding some conceptual
disagreements, all virtue ethicists believe that to fully “have the virtues, or even have [just] one
particular virtue, the agent has to have phronesis, commonly translated as “prudence” or
“practical wisdom.”28 Phronesis is a necessary requirement for the possession of any or all the
virtues because “true virtue requires a firm intellectual basis, and thus virtue requires

22

Annas (1993), 71.
A classic example of “thin” v “thick”: “good” is “thin” but “courageous” is “thick” because
saying someone is “good” is less descriptive than calling them “courageous.”
24
Annas (1993), 48-49.
25
Annas (1993), 49.
26
Annas (1993), 51.
27
For Annas’ full account of the dispositional aspect of virtue see Annas (1993), 49-52.
28
Annas (1993), 73.
23
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intelligence, the developed disposition to reason correctly in moral matters.”29 In short, we need
to develop and acquire reliable practical reasoning “skills” in order to be virtuous.30
Finally, each virtue has an affective component. The virtuous person is the one disposed
to have the correct feelings when performing the morally correct action. They do not just do the
right thing, they also feel the right way — without any countervailing feelings arising. The
virtuous person differs from the enkratic (or “strong-willed”) person on these grounds. Unlike
the virtuous person, the enkratic person feels the wrong way, but like the virtuous person, she
knows what is right, and because of her strong will, she performs the correct action.31 The
virtuous person is superior to the enkratic person because she does not need to exercise selfrestraint and is not disposed to have inappropriate feelings.32
4

ANNAS’ FIRST CRITERION: EMERSON’S ETHICS AND THE SOCRATIC
QUESTION
Many Emerson scholars would likely agree that Emerson’s ethics fit Annas’ first

criterion; i.e. Emerson is ethically concerned with developing our character across our entire life
rather than on isolated actions, outcomes, rules or duties.
For example, David Robinson (1982) has claimed that Emerson’s sermons, lectures and
essays are all ultimately concerned with “self-culture”; that is, the theory and practice of how we

29

Annas (1993), 74.
Annas (1993), 71-72. For Annas’ full account the intellectual aspect of virtue see Annas
(1993), 66-84.
31
Annas (1993), 53-54. Annas does not mention them, but it is helpful to compare examples of a
virtuous and enkratic person to akratic and vicious persons to get a complete picture of how the
three components of virtue work together in the virtuous person. In short, unlike the enkratic
person, the akratic person is weak-willed, and so even though he knows what is right, he feels
the wrong way and performs the wrong actions. Finally, the vicious person neither knows what is
right, nor feels the right way, nor performs the right actions.
32
Annas (1993), 53-54. For Annas’ full account of the affective aspect of virtue see Annas
(1993), 53-65.
30
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can reform our moral character.33 Similarly, Robert. D. Richardson (1995) has claimed that the
question which concerned Emerson throughout his life was not “‘What can I know? But ‘How
should I live?’; Emerson outlines the purpose of life [...] in terms of [...] self-cultivation.”34
Echoing Richardson, Gustaaf van Cromphout (1999) argues that “the question of Socrates” is
what motivates Emerson’s lifelong ethical inquiry; “Emerson embraced the: “comprehensive
Greek view, according to which everything of value to the human good and thus conducive to
the good life falls under the rubric of ethics.”35 Similarly, John Lysaker (2008) has argued at
monograph length that the question of how we should conduct our lives is the question uniting
Emerson’s entire corpus. In Lysaker’s words: “It is no exaggeration to claim that wherever one
turns in Emerson, self-culture is at issue. [...] Conduct of Life is thus not simply the title of one of
Emerson’s late collections. It names that which his claims consistently invoke as a matter in
question for both speaker and addressee.”36 Citing Richardson, James Woelfel (2011) argued
“Emerson sees individual self-knowledge and self-cultivation as the goals of human life, and he
tells his hearers that this view of life represents a revival of ancient Stoic wisdom, rooted in the
Delphic-Socratic maxim[.]”37 More recently, Barry Andrews (2018) has built upon the work of
Pierre Hadot (1995, 1998, 2009) to argue that Emerson’s concept of “self-culture” is directly
modeled on the “spiritual practices” of self-cultivation in Hellenistic Philosophy. Specifically,
Andrews claims that: “As the Transcendentalists [like Emerson] practiced and promoted their
version of the art of living, they looked to examples in the classical traditions, the Stoics, the

33

Robinson (1982), 182
Richardson (1995), 16.
35
Van Cromphout (1999), 1-2.
36
Lysaker (2008), 7-8, 15.
37
Woelfel (2011), 130.
34
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Epicureans, and Neoplatonists in particular.”38 Finally, and most recently, Joseph Urbas (2021)
has argued that Emerson believes “that philosophy’s primary subject is life and the quest for
wisdom rather than the epistemological tradition’s quest for certainty.”39 In short, it would not
be too controversial among Emerson scholars to suggest that Emerson meets Annas' first
criterion.
Yet, this might be an undesirable conclusion for anyone wishing to argue Emerson’s
ethics is primarily consequentialist or deontologist. On the one hand, to my knowledge, no one
has claimed Emerson as a consequentialist. Indeed, Neal Dolan (2009) has observed that in his
journals Emerson caustically rejected Benthamite utilitarianism.40 On the other hand, quite a few
scholars have seen part or all of Emerson’s ethics as Kantian and thus implicitly deontologist.41
Ultimately, while all their arguments are relevant, Emerson himself can best resolve whether he
meets Annas’ first criterion.42
Emerson is often at pains to persuade us we should be more ethically concerned with our
character and life as a whole, rather than isolated duties, rules, or outcomes. Throughout
Emerson’s essays, one of his frequent rhetorical targets of abuse is a morally confused or viceridden social reformer seeking to realize their ideal ethical or political outcomes. Consider “The
Method of Nature,” where Emerson writes:
The reforms whose fame now fills the land with Temperance, Anti-Slavery, Non-Resistance, No
Government, Equal Labor, fair and generous as each appears, are poor bitter things when prosecuted for
themselves as an end. To every reform, in proportion to its energy, early disgusts are incident, so that the
disciple is surprised at the very hour of his first triumphs, with chagrins, and sickness, and a general
distrust: so that he shuns his associates, hates the enterprise which lately seemed so fair, and meditates to

38

Andrews (2017), 95.
Urbas (2021), 107.
40
Dolan (2009), 72.
41
For scholars comparing some aspect of Emerson’s philosophy to Kant see: Cavell (1988), Van
Leer (1986), Goodman (1990), Van Cromphout (1999), Walls (2003), Cladis (2009), Greenham
(2007, 2012), Dolan (2009), Grimstad (2010), Arsic (2010), Cameron (2010).
42
I thank Eric Wilson for suggesting helpful ways to re-work this section entirely.
39
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cast himself into the arms of that society and manner of life which he had newly abandoned with so much
pride and hope. Is it that he attached the value of virtue to some particular practices, as the denial of
certain appetites in certain specified indulgences, and afterward found himself still as wicked and as far
from happiness in that abstinence as he had been in the abuse? But the soul can be appeased not by a deed
but by a tendency. It is in a hope that she feels her wings. You shall love rectitude, and not the disuse of
money or the avoidance of trade; an unimpeded mind, and not a monkish diet; sympathy and usefulness,
and not hoeing or coopering.43

In this passage, Emerson argues that disciples of various social reform movements supporting
“fair” causes often abandon them in favor of cultural conservatism, precisely because they
mistakenly attached “the value of virtue” to a set of “particular practices.” These disciples do not
realize that what matters is not the regulation of one’s own or other’s single “deeds”, but the
lifelong “tendency” of our own and other’s character. What is of primary importance is
“rectitude”, “an unimpeded mind” as well as “sympathy and usefulness.” What is of secondary
importance are “particular practices” like “the disuse of money”, “a monkish diet” much less
“hoeing or coopering.” In other words, Emerson thinks our ethical priority should be our
character and life as a whole, and also that it is mistaken to attribute virtue to isolated actions,
duties, rules, or outcomes. On the basis of passages like these, Neal Dolan (2009) has plausibly
claimed that one of the two major themes in Emerson’s political philosophy is “the priority of
virtue.”44 Similarly, Joseph Urbas (2021) has also argued that “For Emerson, politics is at bottom
an affair of character.”45 Indeed, Emerson asserts his belief in the ethical priority of virtue and
character in one of the most notorious and misunderstood passages in “Self-Reliance”:
I ought to go upright and vital, and speak the rude truth in all ways. If malice and vanity wear the coat of
philanthropy, shall that pass? If an angry bigot assumes this bountiful cause of Abolition, and comes to me
with his last news from Barbadoes, why should I not say to him, 'Go love thy infant; love thy woodchopper: be good-natured and modest: have that grace; and never varnish your hard, uncharitable ambition
with this incredible tenderness for black folk a thousand miles off. Thy love afar is spite at home.' Rough
and graceless would be such greeting, but truth is handsomer than the affectation of love.46

43

Emphasis Mine. CW 1: 214-215.
Dolan (2009), 178-187.
45
Urbas (2021), 255.
46
Emphasis Mine. CW 2: 51.
44

11
This passage is often mistakenly interpreted to suggest Emerson objects to the aim of
abolitionism, condones slavery, or condemns all abolitionists as vicious bigots.47 But, in fact,
Emerson explicitly assumes that abolitionism is a philanthropic and “bountiful” political cause
and by implication that slavery is an evil and that not all abolitionists are necessarily vicious.
Emerson is considering a different question than the merits of abolitionism and all abolitionists.
Emerson is asking us to consider a more general moral problem that the example of a vicious
abolitionist pose: what should a person committed to speaking the rude truth say to a vicious
social reformer supporting a just cause?
Emerson’s answer reveals his ethical priorities, whether or not we agree with them.
Emerson thinks a truthful person should criticize vicious social reformers’ mistaken ethical
priorities and their vices, not overlook either. The hypothetical abolitionist’s desirable political
outcome, with all its proposed ethical rules and duties, does not excuse his more important
character failings; it does not excuse his habitual “malice,” “vanity,” “anger” and bigotry.
Emerson finds this abolitionists “tenderness” and “love” for “black folk” who are distant
strangers “incredible” (as in literally unbelievable) given his vicious character and habitual
“spite” to those most close to him, e.g., his “infant” and the local “woodchopper.” Emerson
believes the “truth” of the matter is that we should be willing to condemn this vicious reformer,

47

Donald Pease (2010), for example, thinks that in this passage Emerson expresses no
“solidarity” with abolitionism, an “aversion” to it in general, and even leaves himself open to the
charge that he had “compromised with slave power.” See Pease (2010) 154. Arriving at a similar
conclusion for different reasons, James Read (2011) claims that in this passage Emerson has
urged the hypothetical abolitionist to “drop” opposing slavery “altogether” because Emerson is
more ethically concerned with what is “present and directly experienced” rather than what is
“abstract and distant.” See Read (2011) 158. Whereas Jason Frank (2011) thinks that Emerson is
critiquing all abolitionists as “partial, single-issue bigots and fanatics.” See Frank (2011), 388389. Yet, Cavell (2003) offers perhaps the strangest misreading of this passage, suggesting that
Emerson is worrying that he is insufficiently virtuous to side with the abolitionists against
slavery. See Cavell (2003), 195.

12
not just for his vices, but also for his confused ethical priorities. Even though he grants that
slavery is an evil political institution, Emerson remains committed to the ethical priority of virtue
and character across one’s lifetime. Like the reformers Emerson criticizes in “The Method of
Nature”, the abolitionist in “Self-Reliance” has mistakenly attributed the value of virtue to a
specific set of ethical and political outcomes.
One might object to Emerson, however, and argue that an abolitionist’s character flaws
are ethically less important than ending slavery. This objection (that Emerson is foolishly
prioritizing cultivating virtue over desired outcomes) concedes that Emerson shares the ethical
priorities a virtue ethicist does. This objection disputes Emerson’s reasons for this conclusion.48
But we don’t need to agree with Emerson’s reasons to conclude he meets Annas’ first criterion.

48

I suspect Emerson thinks that an abolitionists character flaws are ethically more important than
ending slavery because he thinks that excusing some vices to combat vicious things is not just
morally hypocritical, but also likely to be politically ineffective. Emerson would have two
reasons to arrive at this conclusion, one metaphysical and one historical. Emerson’s metaphysical
argument would likely be that vice undermines the political power of individuals because it puts
them in metaphysical conflict with the moral nature of the universe. For evidence Emerson
would make this metaphysical argument, consider Emerson’s claims that “all nature is the rapid
efflux of goodness executing and organizing itself” and that “[c]haracter is this moral order seen
through the medium of an individual nature” and, finally, that “all power is of one kind, a sharing
of the nature of the world.” CW 2: 310, 3: 95-96, 6: 56. In contrast, Emerson’s historical
argument would likely be that opposition to slavery that aims only at legal and political
outcomes is, even if a necessary starting point, not sufficient to address the root causes of
slavery, which Emerson diagnoses as a vicious love of wealth and power alongside a mistaken
(hence vicious) belief in the racial inferiority of “the Niggers.” EAW: 17-18, 35-36. For evidence
Emerson would make this historical argument, consider Emerson’s accurate observation that
even when slavery was legally ended in the British West Indies that the political subjection of
blacks to whites continued because the vices that supported slavery remained undisturbed: “the
habit of oppression was not destroyed by a law[.]” EAW: 17. Thus, for both metaphysical and
historical reasons, Emerson would probably argue that excusing your own vices while seeking to
end vicious institutions is moral hypocrisy that will prove politically ineffective: “[If] I am
selfish, then there is slavery, or the effort to establish it, wherever I go[.]” CW 1: 279-280.
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Another might object that I have yet to give any examples of Emerson directly stating
that rule-following and duty are subordinate to virtue and character. In response, I would argue
that Emerson effectively makes such claims in “Duty” and “Self-Reliance.”
I believe “Duty” reveals Emerson thinks duty is ethically subordinate to virtue:
Deeply considered all Virtue leads us into the presence of that sublime Vision of the right which always lies before
the mind, imposing on it a perfect obligation. [...] This then is the best account of virtue at which we are at present
[in 1839] able to arrive, that, it is the spontaneity of the will, bursting up into the world as a sunbeam out of the
aboriginal cause, This is virtue. And what is duty? It is the endeavor of man to obey this light: the voluntary
conforming our action to the whole; to the inward sentiment never quite absent; the uniform preference of the whole
to the particular. Duty is the application of the sentiment of virtue to the varying events of every day, in making
which, all greatness consists. The measure of the force of the principle [of duty] is of course in the temptation of the
sense.49

There are two ways in which Emerson subordinates “duty” to “virtue” above. For one,
these passages imply a virtuous person is ethically superior to a dutiful person. It is our “duty” to
resist “temptation of the sense” in order so that we may be able to reliably do what is virtuous
throughout “the varying events of the day.” Thus, duty consists, at least in part, in an obligation
to resist the temptation towards acting viciously in specific moments, while a virtue consists, at
least in part, in a disposition to reliably act a certain way through all the events of the day. This
suggests that a virtuous person is superior to a dutiful person, insofar as a virtuous person can
reliably act properly without suffering from temptation, but a dutiful person must struggle with
temptation towards vice from moment to moment.50
The second way in which these passages indicate Emerson thinks duty is subordinate to
virtue is because of the way Emerson defines the relationship between the terms. Virtue is a
“sunbeam out of the aboriginal cause” while duties are only “the endeavor of man to obey this
light.” This definition of virtue is admittedly unsatisfying in some respects (What is the

49

Emphasis Mine. EL 3: 139, 144.
As we shall see later when we examine Emerson on virtue in detail, Emerson argues in favor of
this conclusion; that the truly virtuous need not dutifully struggle with temptation.
50
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aboriginal cause? What is a sunbeam coming out of it?) which is perhaps one reason why
Emerson presents this definition of virtue as tentative, only “the best account” at which he is “at
present able to” articulate in 1839. That said, as tentative and ambiguous as Emerson thinks this
definition of virtue is, his account of the relationship between virtue and duty is unambiguous
and stated without any hesitation. Virtue is a sunbeam, duties are merely the human attempt to
obey the light from this sunbeam. Put less metaphorically, duties derive themselves and their
ethical importance from virtue (whatever virtue is) but duties are not reducible to virtue itself.
Therefore, it seems like Emerson’s notion of duty is ethically subordinate to his concept of virtue
because he appears to think that the virtuous person is superior to the dutiful person and that the
ethical importance of duty derives from virtue.51
A different passage from “Self-Reliance” provides compelling evidence Emerson thinks
rule-following is a secondary concern relative to virtue and character:
The other terror that scares us from self-trust is our consistency; a reverence for our past act or word, because the
eyes of others have no other data for computing our orbit than our past acts, and we are loath to disappoint them.
[...] It seems to be a rule of wisdom never to rely on your memory alone, scarcely even in acts of pure memory, but
to bring the past for judgment into the thousand-eyed present, and live ever in a new day. In your metaphysics you
have denied personality to the Deity: yet when the devout motions of the soul come, yield to them heart and life,
though they should clothe God with shape and color. Leave your theory, as Joseph his coat in the hand of the harlot,
and flee. A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and
divines [theologians]. With [foolish] consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do. He may as well concern
himself with his shadow on the wall. Speak what you think now in hard words, and to-morrow speak what tomorrow thinks in hard words again, though it contradict every thing you said to-day.52

In these passages Emerson notes that a desire for “consistency” or a rule-following “reverence
for our past act or word” can easily prevent us from practicing “self-trust”—which Emerson
defines in “The American Scholar” as the virtue in which “all the virtues are comprehended.”53
Thus, Emerson’s concern is that a desire for rule-following can prevent us from acting

51

For other passages where Emerson appears to articulate the relationship between duties and
virtues, see CW 1: 211, 2: 139, 291, 11: 186.
52
Emphasis Mine. CW 2: 56-57.
53
CW 1: 104.
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virtuously. Emerson is not, however, objecting to rule following or consistency as a rule. Note
how Emerson claims it is “a rule of wisdom” to avoid a mistaken reverence for too consistent
rule following and “bring the past for judgement into the thousand-eyed present.” Problematic
rule-following (“a foolish consistency”) consists in not changing our actions or thoughts to what
we now recognize as superior because “we are loath to disappoint” others by contradicting
ourselves. In other words, “Self-Reliance” posits that the foolish mistakenly prioritize
consistency and rule following over developing their moral and intellectual character, while the
wise think consistent rule following valuable insofar as it aims at virtue and wisdom. In short,
this often anthologized passage from “Self-Reliance” reveals that Emerson thinks rule following
is of ethical value, but subordinate to things like the pursuit of virtue and wisdom.
In conclusion, I have argued that Emerson thinks that rule following, duties, and
outcomes are important moral subjects, but of secondary concern compared to the overriding
importance of virtue and character across one’s life. Ultimately, Emerson’s ethical priorities
reveal that he has the ethical focus of a virtue ethicist, not a utilitarian or deontologist. Thus,
Emerson fits Annas’ first criterion; i.e. he is more ethically concerned with developing our
character across our entire life rather than on isolated actions, outcomes, rules or duties.
5

ANNAS’ SECOND CRITERION: TELEOLOGY AND THE FINAL END IN
EMERSON’S ETHICS
Emerson also meets Annas’ second criterion; his ethics possess a final end.54 Emerson

believes the process of cultivating our moral character is our final end. For example, in an 1837
“Address on Education” Emerson asks “What is the end of human life? It is not, believe me, the
54

I thank MJ Porzenheim for convincing me of this despite my vigorous initial skepticism. If not
for her persistence, I would have remained wrong. I also thank Tim O’Keefe, Eric Wilson, John
Garret and Joseph Urbas for invaluable help with sharpening this section.
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chief end of man that he should make a fortune and beget children whose end is likewise to make
a fortune, but it is, in a few words, that he should explore himself.”55 Similarly, in an 1837
Introductory Lecture “Human Culture” Emerson claims that “His own culture—the unfolding of
his nature, is the chief end of man.”56
Emerson 's concept of self-cultivation (or “self-culture’) has long been recognized by
scholars as influenced by ancient Greek conceptions of self-cultivation, 19th century Unitarian
religious ideals of self-culture, and Goethe’s more aesthetic ideal of Bildung. Simply put, “selfculture” is the catch-all term Emerson uses to describe the various processes by which someone
can improve or “cultivate” their moral character. While a full account of Emerson’s ideas about
self-cultivation exceeds the scope of this essay (and hasn’t yet been written) I suspect most
Emerson scholars would agree that Emerson thought self-cultivation involved the study of the
natural and social sciences, experience of beauty, analysis of historical moral exemplars, practice
of journaling, and the company of others, whether friends, family, or society at large.57
Emerson explains why his telos is self-cultivation in “The Method of Nature”:
A man's wisdom is to know that all ends are momentary, that the best end must be superseded by a better.
[...] You cannot bathe twice in the same river, said Heraclitus; and I add, a man never sees the same object
twice: with his own enlargement the object acquires new aspects. Does not the same law hold for virtue?
[...] I say to you plainly there is no end to which your practical faculty can aim, so sacred or so large, that, if
pursued for itself, will not at last become carrion and an offence to the nostril. The imaginative faculty of
the soul must be fed with objects immense and eternal. Your end should be one inapprehensible to the
senses; then will it be a god always approached, never touched; always giving health.58

In sum, Emerson claims we can and always should be approaching a health-giving end which is
tantamount to the process of self-cultivation. As we approach this telos, it will appear different to
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EL 2: 199.
EL 2: 215.
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For work which touches on what Emerson thought self-cultivation entailed, see Lysaker (2008)
and Andrews (2017). For a work which focuses on the critical role of science in Emerson’s
philosophy see Walls (2003).
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Emphasis Mine. CW 1: 209, 214-216.
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us over time. Therefore, if we make the mistake of trying to precisely define the final end with a
single phrase or word, we will retard our moral progress with “an offence to the nostril.” We can
always perfect ourselves further.59 Thus, Emerson’s final end, self-cultivation, is a lifelong
activity which aims at a state of moral perfection we can never achieve.
Yet, some may still deny that Emerson’s ethics has a telos. As I mentioned earlier, one of
the most popular ways of interpreting Emerson as a philosopher is as a “Emersonian moral
perfectionist” or EMP. Some scholars who have argued Emerson is an EMP have considered
whether his ethics is teleological or has a telos. To the best of my knowledge, all these scholars
of EMP have denied Emerson’s ethics has a telos.60 This is not a coincidence.
The only thing that uncontroversially defines the category of EMP is its lack of
teleology.61 Stanley Cavell (1988) coined the category of EMP to safeguard Emerson from John
Rawls withering criticisms of Aristotelian moral perfectionism in A Theory of Justice (1971).62

Emerson explicitly claims in “Circles” that we can always further perfect our moral character:
“the moral fact of the Unattainable, the flying Perfect [...] [is] [...] at once the inspirer and the
condemner of every success [...] There is no virtue which is final; all are initial. The virtues of
society are vices of the saint. The terror of reform is the discovery that we must cast away our
virtues, or what we have always esteemed such, into the same pit that has consumed our grosser
vices.” CW 2: 301, 316-317.
60
Building on Cavell, Saito (2001) has argued that while EMP shares the Socratic ethical focus
on life as a whole found in Plato and Aristotle, it “sharply contrasts with the teleological form of
Plato’s and Aristotle’s perfectionism.” See Saito (2001), 394-395. Yet, on the other hand, Saito
(2005) waffles on whether Emerson has a teleological ethics. Saito argues (1) that Emerson’s
ethics do “not deny the concept of a telos per se” but that (2) his concept of self hood “rethinks
teleology” despite the fact that (3) Emerson’s telos is “in opposition to classical Greek
teleology.” See Saito (2005), 13, 73. Citing Cavell and Saito in his analysis of EMP, Heikki
Kovalainen (2010) has argued that EMP is not a teleological theory; that EMP has no “final state
or a goal waiting to be realized somewhere in the future, not a fixed telos orienting all our
attempts to come closer to it: a crucial component of the perfectionist life is its goallessness.”
See Kovalainen (2010), 7.
61
I do, however, think that Urbas (2010) has made a strong case that thinking Emerson is an
EMP entails (mistakenly) believing that Emerson’s ethics lacks any ontology.
62
While arguing that Emerson is an EMP, Cavell states that he wants Rawls to be wrong, because
Rawl’s work appears to potentially support the conclusion that Emerson is an elitist and
59
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Cavell claims that the moral perfectionism Rawls is revolted by is a “teleological theory”, but
EMP is “not a teleological theory at all.”63 Given Cavell’s explicit refusal to provide any
“definition” for EMP, it’s not clear anything is an uncontroversially true criterion for the
category other than its lack of teleology.64 Absent this criterion, EMP is indistinguishable from
the “moral perfectionism” of an Aristotle or Plato, which is why this must be a necessary
criterion for the category.65 Yet, for whatever reason, Cavell doesn’t provide any sustained

inegalitarian philosopher whose ideas are incompatible with “democratic life”, when in fact,
Cavell wants to show that Emerson is “essential to that life.” See Cavell (1988), xxiv, 3, 48-55.
The motive for creating the category of EMP is thus no mystery. Cavell wanted to recruit
Emerson into Rawls’ philosophical project. This is worrisome, as it suggests EMP is an ad-hoc
category marketing Emerson to Rawlsian social contract theorists. For more criticisms about
EMP as a description of Emerson, see Urbas (2010, 2016, 2017).
63
Cavell (1988), 48.
64
The nebulous nature of EMP is not a bug. It’s a design feature. Cavell almost defines EMP
when he claims it is a “dimension” or “tradition” of “the moral life” in “Western thought”
running “from Plato and Aristotle to Emerson and Nietzsche” and even “Kant and Mill” which
concerns “the state of one’s soul,” “personal relationships,” and “the necessity of transforming
oneself and of one’s society.” See, Cavell (1988), 2. But this is not the definition of EMP.
Officially, there isn’t one. After offering the previous description Cavell disowns it, explicitly
refusing to provide any official “definition” much less a list of “necessary and sufficient
conditions for using the term”; “there is no closed list of features that constitute [Emersonian
moral] perfectionism.” See, Cavell (1988), 4. Instead, as if Cavell were inventing a genre of
films or stage-plays, Cavell gives a tentative, if not arbitrary, list of 28 EMP “themes” in Plato’s
Republic and 66 different works with these EMP “themes.” See, Cavell (1988), 5-6. I say
Cavell’s list of themes and works is “tentative” and maybe even “arbitrary” because Cavell
invites us to add or remove themes and works as we see fit; “the presence or absence of any text
[or theme] on the list is open to argument.” See, Cavell (1988), 5-6. Later, for whatever unstated
reason, Cavell eventually decided to foreground 2 of his 28 EMP themes. According to Cavell
(2004), the two key themes to EMP are lifelong self cultivation and a focus on the role of friends
in this self cultivation. See Cavell (2004), 26-27. Yet, it’s unclear how to reconcile Cavell (2004)
with Cavell (1988), because their accounts of EMP are incompatible, and Cavell does not argue
for one instead of the other. In short, Cavell intentionally made it nearly impossible to determine
the theoretical commitments of EMP.
65
Even though Cavell refused to offer any necessary conditions for EMP, I propose a lack of
teleology must be a necessary condition for EMP. If it is not, EMP is indistinguishable from
normal moral perfectionism, in which case EMP is an ad-hoc category. For Cavell distinguishing
EMP from moral perfectionism on the basis of teleology, see Cavell (1988), 48. For criticisms
about applying EMP to Emerson, see Urbas (2010, 2016, 2017).
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textual evidence showing Emerson ethics lacks a teleology. This is likely why Cavell gamely
admits we should consider his ideas about Emerson and EMP as “provisional” “intuitions”
marred by “unphilosophical haste” which are presented in “a more literary state, sometimes a
more psychoanalytic state, than a philosopher might wish[.]”66
Aside from Cavell’s desire to entice Rawlsian contractualists into reading Emerson as a
canonical philosopher, why did he assert Emerson’s ethics had no teleology?67 It seems like
Cavell mistakenly assumed that a telos like Aristotle’s cannot be an activity and its own end.
Granting this assumption, Cavell would have been right when he claimed Emerson’s concept of
lifelong self-cultivation was not also a telos akin to Aristotle’s.68 But, this assumption, that a
telos cannot be an activity and its own end, is inaccurate. Aristotle defines our telos as an activity
of the soul expressing complete virtue in a complete lifetime.69 In other words, our telos consists
in ongoing activity,70 and the end of that activity (having a virtuous life) is the activity itself.71

Cavell (1988), xvii, 33. This reflects a general issue with Cavell’s work on Emerson. On the
one hand, he likes to claim he is only offering provisional intuitions with nothing like necessary
and or sufficient conditions. On the other hand, Cavell also likes to make definite truth claims
about features of Emerson’s philosophy. Thus, Cavell can always deny he was ever making truth
claims if you question his truth claims.
67
For Cavell trying to entice Rawlsian social contract theorists, see Cavell (1988), xxiv, 3, 48-55.
68
For Cavell claiming Emerson believed in lifelong self-cultivation, see Cavell (2004), 26-27.
69
Nicomachean Ethics, 1098a10-30.
70
Ibid.
71
Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a10-20.
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Thus, Emerson is no less a virtue ethicist (or even a normal moral perfectionist)72 because his
telos is a never-ending activity (which happens to be identical with lifelong self-cultivation).73
Ultimately, Emerson cannot both be an EMP and a virtue ethicist. One of the necessary
conditions for each category are incompatible. While virtue ethicists generally employ teleology
in their ethics, EMP philosophers never do. Therefore, Emerson is either one or the other, but not
both. Because Emerson thinks we have a telos, Emerson cannot be an EMP.
Alternatively, someone who finds Cavell’s anti-teleological readings of Emerson
persuasive might, like Gustaaf Van Cromphout (1999), grant that Emerson’s ethics have a telos,
but object that Emerson’s end is too “thin” for it to be comparable to the telos of virtue ethicists
like Aristotle, Epicurus or the Stoics.74 If this is true, then Emerson does not meet Annas’ second
criterion. But someone like Gustaaf Van Cromphout makes the mistake of confusing a virtue
ethicists’ telos for a “thick” rather than “thin” concept. As we saw Annas earlier note, our telos is
a “thin” concept that will necessarily remain “thin” while we are developing the virtues: “to
consider our telos as a fixed point to guide our thoughts about the virtues is to get matters wrong
way round” because the process of becoming virtuous is what reveals the contents of the thin
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Cavell was liable to make the mistaken assumption a telos cannot be an activity and its own
end because, as he candidly notes, he was not familiar with the scholarship on moral
perfectionism (and hence how Emerson’s telos does not differ from the telos of a moral
perfectionist like Aristotle): “It is clear that in wishing to characterize a particular moral outlook
best (for me) in the writing of Emerson (and Thoreau), I have made no systematic survey of the
philosophical literature on the subject of perfectionism.” See, Cavell (1988), xviii.
73
Emerson was not radical in his historical and cultural context for identifying our telos with selfcultivation. Many other Unitarian intellectuals in the 19th century did the same, including
Emerson’s mentors. See, Robinson (1982).
74
Van Cromphout denies that we should think of Emerson as possessing a “teleological ethics”
like Aristotle, Epicurus or the Stoics because Emerson does not presuppose “a relatively clear
sense of the end aimed at”; Emerson does not know the detailed “contents” of the human telos
only that ceaseless “Self-realization to be sure, is the end.” See, Van Cromphout (1999), 57.
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final end.75 Thus, Emerson’s telos is not unusual for being “thin” rather than “thick.” It has
enough descriptive content to meet Annas’ second criterion and is comparable to the final ends
of Aristotle, Epicurus, or the Stoics. In conclusion, Emerson meets Annas’ second criterion; his
ethics has a telos: the process of lifelong moral self-cultivation.
6

ANNAS’ THIRD CRITERION: THE TRIPARTITE NATURE OF EMERSONIAN
VIRTUE
Emerson meets Annas’ third criterion because he thinks virtue is a disposition with

affective and intellectual aspects. Neal Dolan (2009) has relevantly noted that:
it is safe to say that ‘virtue’ stands along with ‘truth’ as one of the most commonly used nouns in
Emerson’s writing. It is hard to think of a single address or essay in which the term is not invoked, and it
occupies crucial turning points in many of Emerson’s most important works. 76

Indeed, in striking contrast to Emerson’s usual aversion to defining his terms, Emerson
assiduously defines and argues for his conception of virtue against popular misunderstanding.
Three essays will reveal how Emersonian virtue meets Annas’ third criterion.77
6.1

Virtue as Disposition in “Self-Reliance”
Emersonian virtue contains the first of the three necessary features in order to meet Annas’

third criterion. “Self-Reliance” reveals Emersonian virtue is an acquired disposition to act in a
certain way. Consider how “Self-Reliance” criticizes common but mistaken conceptions of
virtue:
Virtues are, in the popular estimate, rather the exception than the rule. There is the man and his virtues.
Men do what is called a good action, as some piece of courage or charity, much as they would pay a fine in
expiation of daily non-appearance on parade. Their works are done as an apology or extenuation of their
75

Annas (1993), 71.
Dolan (2009), 183.
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While there is scholarship covering the subject of Emerson’s concept of virtue, none of this
scholarship is focused on establishing whether Emerson is a virtue ethicist. For works which
cover the subject of Emersonian virtue, see Berry (1961), Emanuel (1961), Bishop (1964), Van
Leer (1982), Suckiel (1985), Dolan (2009), Van Cromphout (1999), Urbas (2016, 2021).
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living in the world,--as invalids and the insane pay a high board. Their virtues are penances. I do not wish
to expiate, but to live. My life is for itself and not for a spectacle. I much prefer that it should be of a lower
strain, so it be genuine and equal, than that it should be glittering and unsteady. I wish it to be sound and
sweet, and not to need diet and bleeding. [...] Character teaches above our wills. Men imagine that they
communicate their virtue or vice only by overt actions, and do not see that virtue or vice emit a breath every
moment. [...] Why all this deference to Alfred, and Scanderbeg, and Gustavus? Suppose they were virtuous;
did they wear out virtue? As great a stake depends on your private act to-day, as followed their public and
renowned steps.78

In these passages, Emerson mocks the “popular” idea that virtue is disclosed in isolated “overt”
acts or in an “exception” to the everyday “rule” of someone’s habitual actions or “character.” We
do not reveal our virtue in single voluntary acts of “penance”, or in a temporary "diet" or
"bleeding." We reveal our “character”, our virtues and vices, in all our actions (and inactions)
“private” and “public” whether or not we voluntarily “will” this.79 Therefore, those who imagine
that virtue requires single and spectacular “glittering and unsteady” acts of “expiation” are
mistaken. Furthermore, when considering virtuous role models, we should not out of idolatrous
“deference” neglect to cultivate a virtuous character ourselves. We too can acquire the
(supposedly)80 virtuous disposition of legendary military figures like the Anglo-Saxon King
Alfred I (9th CE), the Albanian rebel against the Ottoman Empire, Skanderbeg (15th CE), or the
Swedish King Gustavus Adolphus (17th CE). In short, Emerson sees virtue as an acquired

Emphasis Mine. CW 2: 52-53, 58, 63. Notably, the italic in “There is the man and his virtues”
is Emerson’s own. Emerson’s use of italics here emphasizes just how wrong he thinks it is to
conceive of virtue as something apart from our everyday character.
79
Urbas (2021) argues that Emerson thinks that we reveal our character in our moments of
inaction, not just in our voluntary actions. On the relationship between inaction and character in
Emerson’s ethics and politics see Urbas (2021), 251-257.
80
It’s easy to overlook, but by saying “suppose,” Emerson only commits himself to the position
that we could and should become as virtuous as these military men are supposed to be. Emerson
suggests his audience thinks these figures are virtuous for the sake of his argument, while
distancing himself from claiming these military men were, in fact, virtuous role models.
78
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disposition, and therefore his concept of virtue contains the first of the three features needed to
meet Annas’ third criterion.81
6.2

The Intellectual Aspect of Virtue in “Prudence”
Emersonian virtue also contains the second of the three features needed to meet Annas’

third criterion. In “Prudence” it becomes clear Emersonian has the relevant intellectual aspect.82
“Prudence” explicitly contrasts Emerson’s account of prudence against popular opinion.
Emerson claims that the virtue of prudence is a “faculty” of the mind by which we organize “the
application of means to ends.”83 Emerson distinguishes between “false,” “base,” and “spurious”
prudence relative to “true” and “higher” prudence. Emerson thinks that “true” and “higher”
prudence entails the presence of all the other moral virtues.84 In contrast, “false,” “base,” and
“spurious” prudence is “detached” from the other moral virtues and is the result of seeing
“prudence not to be a several faculty, but [only] a name for wisdom and virtue conversing with
the body and its wants.”85 Thus, just as other virtues entail “true” prudence, “true” prudence
entails all the other moral virtues.86 On the basis of passages like these Edmund G. Berry (1961)
and Joseph Urbas (2021) have plausibly argued that Emerson believes in the unity of the

For a reading of the above passages in “Self-Reliance” which emphasizes Emersonian virtues
relationship with Nietzsche’s ethics see Albrecht (2012) 78-85. For monograph length
comparisons of Emerson’s and Nietzsche’s philosophy see Mikics (2003), Zavatta (2019).
82
I thank Joseph Urbas for suggesting I improve this section by consulting “Prudence.”
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CW 2: 223, 227.
84
CW 2: 222-224, 235.
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CW 2: 222-224.
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Emerson vividly expresses this in the conclusion of “Prudence” like so: "Thus, truth, frankness,
courage, love, humility, and all the virtues, range themselves on the side of prudence, or the art
of securing a present well-being. I do not know if all matter will be found to be made of one
element, as oxygen or hydrogen, at last, but the world of manners and actions is wrought of one
stuff[.]" CW 2: 240-241. Emerson also indicates his belief in the unity of the virtues elsewhere
when, in a lecture in support of a temperance society, he states that the virtue of temperance is
required if we are to acquire any other virtue. LL 1: 73, 79.
81
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virtues.87 Urbas relevantly notes that Emerson states his belief in the unity of the virtues perhaps
most explicitly in “The American Scholar”, where he defines “self-trust” as the virtue in which
“all the virtues are comprehended.”88
In sum, Emerson’s account of “self-trust” and “true” and “higher” prudence reveals (1)
that all virtues have the intellectual aspect of phronesis and (2) that Emerson thinks, like a Stoic,
that the virtues are a unity.89 Thus, Emerson’s account of prudence offers sufficient evidence to
conclude Emersonian virtue possesses the second of the three features required to meet Annas’
third criterion.
6.3

The Affective Aspect of Virtue in “Spiritual Laws”
Emersonian virtue possesses the third of the three features needed for it to meet Annas’

third criterion. “Spiritual Laws” reveals Emersonian virtue has the necessary affective
component. Again, Emerson contrasts popular ideas about virtue to his own:
Our moral nature is vitiated by any interference of our will. People represent virtue as a struggle, and take
to themselves great airs upon their attainments, and the question is everywhere vexed when a noble nature
is commended, whether the man is not better who strives with temptation. But there is no merit in the
matter. Either God is there or he is not there. We love characters in proportion as they are impulsive and
spontaneous. The less a man thinks or knows about his virtues the better we like him. [...] When we see a
soul whose acts are all regal, graceful and pleasant as roses, we must thank God that such things can be and
are, and not turn sourly on the angel and say 'Crump is a better man with his grunting resistance to all his
native devils.'90
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See Berry, (1961) 166-171 as well as Urbas (2021) 110-115. John Lysaker (2017) also notes
that Emerson distinguishes between and true and false prudence and comes to similar
conclusions about Emerson’s concept of prudence in “Prudence”: “Emerson’s response [to
popular misconceptions of prudence] is something like an exhortation—be prudent but only
within a teleological orientation funded by wisdom.” See Lysaker (2017), 142. That said, I
disagree with Lysaker’s suggestion that the essay “Heroism” somehow “rejects or “opposes” the
claims about prudence in “Prudence.” See Lysaker (2017), 142-143, 150-151. “Heroism”
employs the same distinction between true/false prudence elaborated in “Prudence.” To wit,
“Heroism” asserts that only false prudence competes with the virtue of heroism: “That false
prudence which dotes on health and wealth is the butt and merriment of heroism.” CW 2: 252.
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CW 1: 104.
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All virtue ethicists believe virtue has an intellectual aspect, but not all virtue ethicists believe,
like a Stoic, in “the unity of the virtues.” For more on this see, see Annas (1993), 66-84.
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Emphasis mine. CW 2: 133-134.
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Emerson is considering whether a virtuous person would struggle to do virtuous actions because
of countervailing feelings, or if they would lack such tempting feelings to begin with. Emerson
invents a hypothetical individual named “Crump.” Crump knows the right thing to do but does
not feel the right way and struggles to do the right thing because of his “native devils.” Crump
stands in contrast to the hypothetical individual whose habitual actions are morally correct as
well as “impulsive and spontaneous ... graceful and pleasant.” Emerson concludes that such
individuals exist and are truly virtuous, unlike Crump, who struggles with “temptation.” Crump
falls short of virtue not because he lacks the knowledge of the right thing to do, or fails to do the
right thing, but because he fails to reliably feel the right way. It is a habitual “struggle” for
Crump to do the right thing. The unstated conclusion in this passage is that many people
mistakenly consider it virtuous to struggle to do the right thing.91 Thus, the affective component
of virtue is clearly present in Emersonian virtue, and therefore Emersonian virtue possesses the
third of the three features required by Annas’ third criterion.
7

RE-EVALUATING BUELL, CAFARO, LYSAKER AND URBAS’ ARGUMENTS
Emerson’s ethics fits all three of Annas’ criteria. He focuses on the Socratic ethical concern

for our life as a whole, not isolated rules duties or outcomes. His ethics have a telos, namely,
self-cultivation. Finally, his concept of virtue has the key three features—it is a disposition with
an affective and intellectual component.92 Therefore, Emerson is a virtue ethicist.
91

Crump is a perfect portrait of the enkratic individual. He reliably lacks the right affect, but
knows the right thing to do and does it. On a related note, Emerson was aware of and approved
of Aristotle’s distinction between the enkratic and virtuous individual. J 3:427.
92
I am not claiming that Emerson always uses all three of these aspects of the word “virtue”
when he writes the word. He certainly does not. (Sometimes he refers to virtue as a kind of
charismatic power or as the general excellence of something.) Nor am I claiming that Emerson is
always in complete agreement with any or all virtue ethicists about the nature of virtue. My
conclusion is only that Emerson can meet this criterion Annas offers despite if and when future
scholarship finds ways in which Emerson’s concept of virtue sometimes differs from other virtue
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We should now re-evaluate the arguments of other scholars who have already considered
this possibility. Buell and Cafaro argued that Emerson was a virtue ethicist because his ethics
focus on character and our lives as a whole rather than isolated actions, which is a true
characterization of Emerson’s ethics, though not a sufficient reason to call someone a virtue
ethicist. Lysaker also thought that Emerson’s ethics shared this Socratic focus. But he
(accurately) did not think this was sufficient to determine Emerson was a virtue ethicist. Yet,
Lysaker rejected calling Emerson a virtue ethicist for a different reason. Lysaker thought
“Emerson’s thought shows signs of too many schools of ethical thought to fit neatly into any one
[like virtue ethics].”93 I believe there are two important problems with this argument.94
The first is that Emerson does neatly fit into the category of virtue ethics. Emerson does
not struggle to meet any of Annas’ criteria. Ultimately, for an argument like Lysakers to refute
my own, someone would need to show that there are significant enough elements of Emerson’s
philosophy that are incompatible with classifying him as a virtue ethicist. That would prove a
difficult task, because “virtue ethics” is more like a common set of tendencies than a totalizing
school of thought. This is the second problem with Lysaker’s argument. It seems to rely on a
false unstated premise, namely that a “virtue ethicist” cannot belong to other ethical categories.
Yet, this is false. It is possible to be a virtue ethicist that also fits into other ethical categories.

ethicists. Research nuancing and challenging my argument by comparing Emerson to specific
virtue ethicists is something I desire to write and read, especially regarding Emerson’s
understudied engagement with Confucianism. But it will remain difficult to justify such work
until researching Emerson as a philosopher of virtue ethics becomes less novel. For evidence that
generations of scholars have marginalized and denied the influence of Confucianism on
Emerson, see Foust (2017), 18-22. On Emerson’s relationship to Confucianism see Simmons
(2013), Takanashi (2014), Dolan and Wey (2015), Foust (2015, 2017).
93
Lysaker (2008), 208.
94
I thank Eric Wilson and Tim O’Keefe for suggesting some of the following replies to Lysaker.
I also thank Aaron Richardson for helping clarify these replies further.
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Consider, for example, an ancient virtue ethicist like Epicurus who is a hedonist with a
contractarian political theory.95 Or, perhaps influential medieval virtue ethicists like the Catholic
Thomas Aquinas or the Muslim Ibn Miskawayh.96 Or, why not more modern virtue ethicists like
Adam Smith (who is also a moral sentimentalist) or Martha Nussbaum (who is also a
feminist)?97 Thus, to conclude that Emerson’s ethics shows signs of too many schools of thought
to neatly fit into virtue ethics is unconvincing because this conclusion relies on the false
assumption that virtue ethics is a far more exclusive ethical category than it actually is.
Finally, Urbas argues that Emerson was a virtue ethicist because his concept of prudence
entailed the unity of the virtues. Yet, while it is true Emerson believes in the unity of the virtues
this alone is an insufficient reason to call someone a virtue ethicist.
Ultimately, Buell, Cafaro, Lysaker and Urbas each have their merits. Lysaker has the wrong
conclusion, but for some good reasons. In contrast, Buell, Cafaro, and Urbas have the right
conclusion for inadequate reasons.
8

CONCLUSION: WHY SEEING EMERSON AS A VIRTUE ETHICIST MATTERS
My proposed label may be accurate, but why should anyone bother to use it? I will conclude

with five reasons why I think it matters to recognize Emerson as a virtue ethicist.98
First, recognizing Emerson as a virtue ethicist would help clarify Emerson’s key concept of
“the moral sentiment.” Over the last thirty years many Emerson scholars have plausibly argued

95

For Epicureanism as a virtue ethicist and contractarian see Thrasher (2013).
For Aquinas as a virtue ethicist, see Nelson (1992). For Miskawah as a virtue ethicist see
Zargar (2017).
97
For Adam Smith as a virtue ethicist see Hanley (2017). I take it for granted Martha Nussbaum
is famous enough as a virtue ethicist and feminist that I don’t need to cite evidence for this claim.
98
I thank Eric Wilson for suggesting I scrap the previous conclusion, good riddance to it. I also
thank John Lysaker for generously talking through potential options for this conclusion, and
Connor Kianpour for pushing me to directly answer the so what.
96
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that the Scottish Enlightenment idea of the “moral sentiment” is the most important concept in
Emerson’s ethics.99 However, few have noticed “the moral sentiment” and “virtue” are
inseparable for Emerson.100 Gustaaf Van Cromphout (1999) has rightly suggested Emerson’s
scandalous and famous “Divinity School Address” is the single best essay to read in order to

99

While the last thirty years have seen multiple scholars explicitly arguing that the moral
sentiment is the most important concept in Emerson’s ethics, the general importance of this
concept has never really been doubted. William James was perhaps the first to notice the
importance of the concept to Emerson. William James (1911) claimed that if we want to
understand Emersons’s key “conviction that divinity is everywhere” we need to understand
“what he calls the moral sentiment.” Later, Stephen Whicher (1953) claimed that “the moral
sentiment” is a term which “so often recurs” in Emerson’s writing in response to the challenge of
Humean skepticism. See, Whicher (1953), 14-15, 175-176. More specifically, Jonathan Bishop
(1964) argued that the moral sentiment “was a cornerstone of his [Emerson’s] faith”; a key part
of “the moral dimension” of his thought and his general “ethical vocabulary.” See Bishop (1964),
66, 23, 68. Building on Whicher, Barbara Packer (1982) argued that Emerson’s concept of the
moral sentiment is critical to understanding his response to skepticism, it was the “Archimedean
point that gave him leverage on the slippery world of experience.” See, Packer (1982), 36. More
generally, Merton Sealts (1992) argued that one of the “cardinal principles of Emerson’s thinking
[...] [was] [...] what he liked to call ‘the moral sentiment’”; Emerson was “ever an apostle of the
moral sentiment.” See, Sealts (1992), 208, 214. Influenced by Sealts, David Robinson (1993)
argued that the “moral sentiment” is the key term in Emerson’s ethics; that it is his “bedrock of
consistency” and “foundation of his earliest thinking and the most important point of continuity
in his thinking from first to last.” See Robinson (1993), 7, 195. Similarly, Gustaaf Van
Cromphout (1999) reluctantly admits that “a primary concern of Emerson’s [ethics] was to
establish the universality of the moral sentiment” and thus this marks a “fundamental difference”
between Emerson and Kant’s ethics. See Van Cromphout (1999), 34, 47. Echoing Van
Cromphout, Neal Dolan (2009) has claimed that “the Scottish enlightenment idea of moral
sentiment [is] at the heart of much of Emerson’s writing; indeed, it is arguably the cornerstone of
his entire intellectual edifice.” See Dolan (2009), 200-201. Directly building on Robinson,
Joseph Urbas has claimed that when “it comes to Emerson’s ethics and his vision of human
perfectibility, reference to the moral sentiment is not optional, even if we find the doctrine
dissatisfactory.” See Urbas (2010), 4. Berger (2015) has independently argued that “the
continuity in Emerson’s thought regarding religious [and moral] sentiment and its radical effects
has been obscured by the shifting rhetorical positioning of Emerson’s writing.” See Berger
(2015), 479. Recently, Urbas (2016) has claimed that “the moral sentiment is indeed the best
basis for any general account of the unity of Emerson’s thought.” See Urbas (2016), 157. Most
recently, Urbas (2021) has provided such a general account of Emerson’s thought centered on
Emerson’s concept of the moral sentiment.
100
Emanuel (1961) and Bishop (1964) and Urbas (2016, 2021) have explicitly observed the
connection, but are the only ones to do so far as I am aware.
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understand Emerson’s concept of “the moral sentiment.”101 Indeed, by sheer numbers, Emerson
refers to “the moral sentiment” more often in this essay than in any other work in his corpus. A
glance at the first four paragraphs of the “Divinity School Address” reveals that the “sentiment
of virtue” and “the moral sentiment” are interchangeable terms and that “the moral sentiment” is
present in “every virtuous act and thought” as it is “the essence of all religion.”102 In other words,
Emerson thinks possessing virtue is a sufficient condition for possessing “the moral sentiment”
and vice versa. This means these two concepts cannot be fully understood in isolation from each
other. This prompts an urgent question for any future work on Emerson’s ethics: how do we
reconcile Emerson’s belief in the spontaneous and intuitive feelings of “the moral sentiment”
with his belief in virtue as a disposition with affective and intellectual components?103 Properly
answering this question exceeds the scope of this thesis. That said, I speculate that the moral
sentiment is, at least in part, one way Emerson refers to the affective state of perceiving or
performing virtuous actions. In any event, much more work on this key conceptual relationship
in Emerson’s ethics is clearly needed, but only made so obviously crucial by considering
Emerson a virtue ethicist.104 In short, by recognizing Emerson as a virtue ethicist, we gain a new
tool to help demystify one of Emerson’s key concepts.
Second, recognizing Emerson as a virtue ethicist would help clarify the ongoing debate
about Emerson’s political philosophy in general, and his philosophy of social reform in

Van Cromphout (1999), 36. Morton Sealts (1992) has relevantly observed that “the moral
sentiment” is “the governing theme” of this address. See, Sealts (1992), 117.
102
CW 1.120-122.
103
While this isn’t a question Joseph Urbas sets himself the task of answering, I think he
indirectly provides some potential answers in The Philosophy of Ralph Waldo Emerson (2021).
This work is an invaluable resource for anyone considering this question. More than any other
scholar Urbas has set himself the task of clarifying Emerson’s concept of the moral sentiment.
104
I thank John Lysaker and Joseph Urbas for drawing this question to my attention.
101
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particular. Disagreement arguably focuses on five subjects: whether the ethical priority Emerson
gives to virtue (1) is theoretically coherent as a political philosophy, (2) practically useful, (3)
generally good or bad, (4) entails racism, sexism or classism, or (5) allows Emerson’s
philosophy to be consistent with his historical support for reform movements.105 If we recognize
Emerson as a virtue ethicist, then this debate about Emerson turns out to fit within much larger
debates in other disciplines about the theory, practice, and history of virtue ethics. Thus,
considering Emerson a virtue ethicist is desirable, because it would allow Emerson scholars to
make good use of the vast secondary literature on virtue ethicists and their political theories.106
Borden Flanagan (2011) offers an excellent example of this approach, as he argues Emerson’s
political philosophy fuses liberalism’s concern for liberty and equality with ancient aretaic
concern for virtue and wisdom.107
Third, calling Emerson a virtue ethicist would help explain Emerson’s well-known debts to
ancient Greek, Christian, Chinese, Persian, Islamic, and Indian philosophers concerned with
virtue and character. Recognizing Emerson as a virtue ethicist would aid scholars tracing and
researching Emerson’s different debts to these various philosophers. Rather than continuing to
conduct their research in relative isolation from each other, designating Emerson as a virtue
ethicist would offer a lingua franca for them to coordinate future research.

In David Robinson’s (1993) still true words: “We are now inclined to ask whether Emerson’s
commitment to the individual self neutralized his support of socially progressive goals.” See
Robinson (1993), 40-41. Len Gougeon (2017) offers a recent and helpful introduction to these
ongoing debates. See Gougeon (2017), 165-216.
106
It works the other way too. Scholars interested in virtue ethicists, especially in the modern
ones, might find Emerson has something exciting to offer them.
107
Flanagan (2011). For the most complete work on Emerson’s philosophical engagement with
liberalism, see Dolan (2009).
105
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A fourth reason to call Emerson a virtue ethicist is that it reveals a fatal flaw with one of the
common readings of Emerson as a philosopher, i.e. reading Emerson as an EMP. I showed
earlier that Emerson cannot both be a virtue ethicist and an EMP. This has urgent ramifications
for all future work on Emerson as a philosopher. Future EMP advocates either need to redefine
the key criteria of the category, refute my conclusions, or abandon using the category altogether.
Fifth, calling Emerson a virtue ethicist provides a new tool for the increasing number of
scholars arguing Emerson should be seen as a canonical philosopher. If it became conventional
to recognize Emerson as a virtue ethicist this would help normalize philosophical research on
Emerson because “virtue ethics” is a canonical and well-defined category in contemporary
professional philosophy. If Emerson is to become a canonical philosopher, then his scholarly
advocates would probably benefit from advancing arguments, like my own, which situate
Emerson in a canonical category with clearly established criteria.108
Ultimately, the best reason to consider Emerson a virtue ethicist is because it’s an accurate
description. The same cannot necessarily be said of the other common but controversial
philosophical labels for him.
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